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Should surgeons offer uterus trans-plants to women who want to be-come pregnant but do not have a 
functioning uterus? The debate reminds 
us that society often neglects the inter-
ests of the infertile.
Only a handful of uterus transplants 
have been reported worldwide—in-
cluding two this past September1—but 
advances in technique may make the 
transplants available more widely. Some 
women are born without a functioning 
uterus; others have hysterectomies for 
cancer, postpartum hemorrhage, or oth-
er reasons. Many of these women want 
to become mothers and carry their own 
pregnancies.
However, the prospect of uterus 
transplantation has elicited sharp criti-
cism. According to ethics professor Re-
becca Kukla, the surgery is not, “in any 
traditional sense, therapeutic.”2
Why the controversy? After all, sur-
geons routinely transplant hearts, lungs, 
livers, and kidneys. If a woman can 
receive a new kidney, why not a new 
uterus? Ethicists have raised a number 
of objections, but on close examination, 
none seems persuasive.
First, some scholars have distin-
guished life-extending organs from 
life-enhancing body parts like faces and 
hands. As long as transplant recipients 
have their new organs, they must take 
drugs to prevent their immune systems 
from rejecting the transplanted organs. 
The risks can be substantial. For exam-
ple, the immunosuppressive drugs put 
people at an increased risk of cancer. It 
is one thing to assume serious health 
risks for the possibility of a longer life, 
but are the risks of being a transplant 
recipient justified by improvements in 
the quality of life?3
There are a few important responses 
to concerns about risk. For example, 
over time, scientific advances have re-
duced the side effects from immuno-
suppression. The risks are not as serious 
as they used to be. In addition, a trans-
planted uterus can be removed after 
childbirth, avoiding the need for long-
term immunosuppression that exists 
with other kinds of transplants. Finally, 
we generally allow patients to weigh the 
benefits and risks of medical treatment 
for themselves. Absent a disproportion-
ate balance between risks and benefits, 
it is not appropriate for society to usurp 
patients’ health care decision-making 
power. Hence, face and hand trans-
plants are becoming more common 
even though they do not prolong life.4
Critics of uterus transplants also 
worry about health risks to others. Per-
haps women can weigh for themselves 
whether the benefits of uterus trans-
plantation outweigh the risks. But they 
are not the only people whose health 
might be jeopardized. If a woman is 
taking immunosuppressive drugs dur-
ing her pregnancy, what risks are posed 
to the child-to-be?5
Although no woman has yet given 
birth after a uterus transplant, we still 
have some important evidence regarding 
the risks to fetuses from immunosup-
pressive drugs. Recipients of kidneys, 
livers, and other organs take the same 
immunosuppressive drugs as would re-
cipients of a uterus transplant, and more 
than fifteen thousand children have 
been born to transplant recipients since 
the 1950s.
Although the data are not definitive, 
they are generally reassuring. While 
children exposed to immunosuppressive 
drugs during pregnancy are more likely 
to have a premature birth and low birth 
weight, they do not appear to be at el-
evated risk of physical malformations or 
other serious side effects.6 Moreover, it 
is generally difficult to argue that people 
should not reproduce because of the 
health risks to their offspring. Procre-
ation is a right of fundamental impor-
tance and should be recognized for all 
persons, even if they may pass a seri-
ous disease to their children. Thus, for 
example, it is acceptable for women to 
reproduce when they are infected with 
HIV or carry the gene for a severe in-
herited disorder.
Of course, steps often can be taken 
to minimize the risk that an infectious 
or genetic disease will be transmitted 
from women to child. Still, even when 
risks remain, the right to reproduce is 
preserved.
But, one might say, there is an im-
portant difference between women who 
undergo uterus transplants and women 
who have infectious or genetic diseases. 
These latter women often cannot have 
biologically related children without ex-
posing them to the risk of their health 
status. The woman wanting a uterus 
transplant can have biologically related 
children through in vitro fertilization 
and gestational surrogacy. Thus, she 
can have genetic ties to her children 
and also protect them from exposure 
to immunosuppressive drugs. As Kukla 
observed, “tons of people have perfectly 
normal lives without gestating a biologi-
cal child.”7
Many women may be perfectly hap-
py despite losing their ability to carry a 
pregnancy, but that should not lead us 
to dismiss the interests of those women 
who very much want to become moth-
ers through pregnancy. Indeed, there are 
serious disadvantages if a woman lack-
ing a functioning uterus tries to have 
children without a transplant. If she be-
comes a parent through adoption, she 
lacks biological ties to her children. In 
addition, her offspring may suffer from 
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significant developmental problems that 
were not detected before the adoption.
Gestational surrogacy can ensure a 
genetic relationship with children, but 
it has serious drawbacks, too. In some 
states and countries, it is prohibited by 
law.8 In addition, the genetic mother 
loses the ability to develop gestational 
ties with her child. As illustrated by 
the disputes between surrogates and in-
tended mothers, gestational ties play a 
significant role in forming motherhood. 
For many women, parenting without 
pregnancy will leave a significant void.
A gestational surrogate may suffer 
from her participation, as well. She may 
not anticipate the extent to which she 
will develop maternal ties during preg-
nancy, nor how difficult it will be to 
relinquish her parental role. Hence, she 
may wish to maintain her relationship 
with her child. Her desire for an ongo-
ing relationship also can pose problems 
for the biological parents, especially if 
she sues to establish parental rights.
Indeed, with all alternatives to uterus 
transplants, a woman must share her 
parenthood with another woman, who 
typically will be a stranger to the wom-
an’s family. People care very much who 
they include in their families, whether 
through marriage or other relation-
ships, and that is no less true for shared 
parenting.9 Denying uterus transplants 
greatly interferes with women’s ability 
to shape their families according to their 
own values and preferences.
If the arguments against uterus trans-
plants seem weak, then we should con-
sider whether other factors are at work. 
What else might explain the objections 
to uterus transplants?
There is good reason to worry that 
public policy in the United States gives 
short shrift to the interests of infertile 
persons. Rather than viewing infertil-
ity as a disability and infertile persons 
as deserving assistance in their efforts 
to procreate, many Americans dismiss 
the idea that infertility is disabling.10 In 
one study, for example, Elizabeth Britt 
found that the infertile often feel as if the 
seriousness of their condition is “trivial-
ized.” Other people might suggest that 
infertility is not as bad as other medical 
conditions because reproduction “sup-
posedly is so optional,” or they might 
even suggest that infertility is a “blessing 
in disguise.”11 In Arthur Greil’s study, 
infertile persons reported that friends 
and family often “act as if . . . infertility 
were a small and relatively easy problem 
to solve.” Infertile couples did not feel 
like they were viewed as inferior because 
of their infertility. Rather, the discrimi-
nation they felt arose out of a “failure 
of others to acknowledge the seriousness 
of infertility.”12 Similarly, in academic 
commentary or judicial decisions, infer-
tility may be characterized as the loss of 
a “lifestyle choice” rather than the loss 
of an important capability.13
It is troubling enough that infertility 
may not be seen as disabling. In addi-
tion, infertility actually may be seen as 
enabling. Having children, in this view, 
places one at a disadvantage when it 
comes to opportunities for a fulfilling 
life, whether in the professional world 
or with one’s partner. As Germaine 
Greer has observed, “Modern society is 
unique in that it is profoundly hostile to 
children. . . . Mothers who are deeply 
involved in exploring and developing 
infant intelligence and personality . . . 
share the infant’s ostracized status.”14
While not having children may be 
a blessing for some people, it is hardly 
that for others. Given the fundamental 
importance of procreation, the impact 
of infertility can be substantial. In one 
study, infertility was the most upsetting 
experience for 50 percent of women. In-
deed, when infertility is a consequence 
of cancer or its treatment, some cancer 
survivors describe the loss of fertility as 
causing as much emotional pain as the 
cancer itself.15
There are many important reasons 
why women want to bear their own 
children. Women may want to have 
children with their chosen partner and 
without the involvement of third par-
ties. They also may want to benefit from 
the ties with their children that develop 
during pregnancy. For these and other 
reasons, we should not be overly skepti-
cal of uterus transplants.
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